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Abstract - This paper provides an overview of existing research on how corporate 
restructuring  affects  the  wealth  of  creditors.  Restructuring  is  defined  as  any 
transaction that affects the firm’s underlying capital structure. Thus, it reaches well 
beyond  asset  restructuring  and  includes  transactions  such  as  leveraged  buyouts, 
security  issues  and  exchanges,  and  the  issuance  of  stock  options.  The  analysis 
identifies  significant  gaps  in  the  literature,  emphasizes  the  potential  differences 
between  creditor  wealth  changes  in  market-  and  network-oriented  governance 
systems, and provides valuable insights into methodological advances. Many issues 
obviously remain, as empirical evidence is still incomplete and focuses exclusively on 
the US. In network-oriented regimes, the potential for research remains constrained 
by  the  lesser  development  of  bond  markets  that  disclose  information  on  creditor 
wealth  shocks.  Still,  on-going  debt  securitization  should  now  allow  for  the 
investigation of at least some critical issues. This is imperative, as the position of 
creditors  in  the  firm  differs  substantially  across  governance  systems  despite  the 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The last decade or so has witnessed a spectacular surge in corporate restructuring 
across the globe. Market deregulation, technological shocks and intense competition 
for capital supply have pressured firms into moving beyond changing their business 
and financing strategies, and making major changes in their organizational structures. 
Restructuring activity has been most pronounced in the US, where the merger wave of 
the  latter  part  of  the  decade  was  the  fifth  of  the  twentieth  century.  Firms  have 
increasingly found that sheer size was no longer sufficient to deter a takeover threat. 
As  a  result,  and  also  motivated  by  other  sources  of  managerial  discipline, 
restructuring activity has largely focused on increasing corporate efficiency, through 
corporate  refocusing  and  financial  restructuring.  In  Europe,  where  market-based 
disciplinary mechanisms have historically been weaker, the reconfiguration of firms 
has  been  slower  but  has  accelerated  in  response  to  the  on-going  economic  and 
financial integration of  the continent, driven by concerted efforts of the European 
Union. In Japan, the restructuring process has been measured and painful, but most 
firms have undergone some form of reorganization in response to the burst of the 
asset  bubble  in  the  late  1980s,  and  the  banking  crisis  and  continued  economic 
stagnation that followed. 
 
This paper provides a comprehensive overview of existing academic research on how 
restructuring affects the wealth of creditors, a critical issue that has still not been 
addressed adequately in the literature.  Fixed creditor claims are impacted not only by 
the firm’s post-restructuring performance and cash flow volatility, but also by any 
unexpected changes in its capital structure, which in turn have a direct impact on 
default  risk.  The  view  that  the  firm’s  capital  structure  choice  may  be  specifically 
motivated  by  the  creditor-shareholder  conflict  has  been  universal  since  Black  and 
Scholes (1973). Their landmark paper views a levered firm’s equity as a call option 
on the firm’s assets, which implies that risk-increasing changes in capital structure 
benefit shareholders to the detriment of creditors. The literature has established that  
such  capital  structure  changes  may  also  impact  operating  performance  through 
investment distortions such as excessive risk taking (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and 
underinvestment (Myers, 1977), although at the same time the disciplinary effect of 
leverage  on  management  has  also  been  emphasized  (Jensen,  1986;  Grossman  and 
Hart, 1983). Corporate Restructuring and Bondholder Wealth  2
 
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  various  agency  costs  of  the  shareholder-creditor 
conflict are more pronounced in the market-oriented corporate governance systems of 
the Anglo-American countries. In these regimes, managers are provided arm’s-length 
incentives by developed security markets to maximize shareholder and creditor wealth 
simultaneously  (Fama,  1978).  Informational  asymmetries  may  be  accentuated 
however,  as  public  information  disclosure  reduces  investors’  incentives  to 
individually invest in monitoring (Boyd and Prescott, 1986). In the network-oriented 
regimes  of  Continental  Europe  and  Japan,  corporate  debt  markets  remain  less 
developed. Still, banks as delegated monitors can better ease distortions emanating 
from asymmetric information through forming long-run relationships with firms, and, 
through monitoring, contain moral hazard (Stiglitz, 1985; Diamond, 1991). Crucially, 
this setup should also guarantee that in these systems the shareholder-creditor conflict 
is less severe. 
 
Thus far, direct empirical evidence on how corporate restructuring affects creditors 
has been limited to the US, with the exception of the study by Renneboog, Szilagyi 
and  Martynova  (2006)  on  European  merger  activity.  The  analysis  presented  here 
identifies  significant  gaps  in  the  literature,  emphasizes  the  potential  differences 
between  creditor  wealth  changes  in  market-  and  network-oriented  governance 
systems, as well as provides valuable insights into the evolution of the methodology 
used. In network-oriented regimes, the potential for research remains constrained by 
the limited size and liquidity of corporate debt markets, which disclose information on 
shocks to creditor wealth. But, on-going debt securitization should now allow for the 
investigation  of  at  least  some  of  the  critical  issues.  Firstly,  it  has  yet  to  be 
demonstrated  empirically  that  intermediaries  as  delegated  monitors  are  better  at 
mitigating agency problems and protecting creditors in restructuring transactions. If 
this is indeed the case, wealth losses suffered by bondholders should be lower than in 
a market-oriented system. Secondly, an important question is whether the types and 
conditions of restructuring transactions are different in network-oriented regimes, and 
to  what  extent  this  owes  to  powerful  creditors  blocking  transactions  that  may  be 
economically desirable but would hurt creditor wealth. Thirdly, the internationalized 
corporate environment has been shown to feed a gradual convergence of governance 
systems. In network-oriented regimes, this process implies a shift of priority from 
stakeholder  consensus  to  shareholder  value,  and  involves  the  promotion  of  debt 
securitization and the deterioration of creditor influence. Banks’ incentives to invest 
in monitoring are reduced by these factors, which implies a qualitative change in their 
economic  role.  This  comes  at  a  time  when  market-based  disciplinary  devices  are 
being increasingly questioned in their ability to control agency problems, not least due Corporate Restructuring and Bondholder Wealth  3
to the recent massive overinvestment in the US technology sector and some of the 
biggest corporate scandals in history. A key research question is whether these events 
change the way creditor wealth is altered by corporate restructuring actions. 
 
The rest of this paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of academic 
theory that explains the potential motivations and effects of restructuring transactions 
with special regard to the impact of these on creditor wealth. A detailed analysis of 
the empirical evidence on the bondholder wealth effects of corporate restructuring is 
provided  in  Section  3.  Section  4  allows  for  concluding  remarks  and  raises  some 
questions for future research. 
 
 
2.  Theoretical background 
 
Restructuring activity is generally associated with three motivations in the academic 
literature,  namely  (i)  to  address  poor  performance;  (ii)  to  exploit  strategic 
opportunities and (iii) to correct valuation errors. The literature distinguishes three 
different  types  of  transactions,  encompassing  multiple  forms  of  change  in  firm 
organization (Stewart and Glassman 1988; Bowman and Singh 1993; Gibbs 1993). 
Portfolio restructuring makes disposals from and additions to a firm’s businesses, 
through asset sales, spin-offs, equity carve-outs or mergers and acquisitions (M&As). 
Financial restructuring changes the  firm’s capital structure  e.g. through leveraged 
buy-outs  (LBOs),  recapitalizations  (LRs),  share  repurchases,  or  employee  stock 
ownership plans (ESOPs). Finally, organizational restructuring, represents a change 
from  a  functional  to  a  business-unit  design.  These  restructurings  often  occur 
simultaneously or sequentially. 
 
The empirical literature has given notable attention in recent years to the immediate 
reaction of equity and bond markets to restructuring activity in the US.  Security price 
reactions  are  complex  and  represent  a  net  reaction  to  a  number  of  factors  that 
influence how restructuring affects shareholder and creditor wealth. In this section, 
the main hypotheses that affect the size and direction of these wealth changes are 
presented, emphasizing in particular the wealth of creditors. 
  
(a) Value creation 
The classic motivation for corporate restructuring is to redeploy the firm’s assets to 
higher  valued  uses.  As  long  as  the  restructuring  improves  the  firm’s  operating 
performance and increases its post-transaction cash flow and debt servicing ability, it 
creates value for both shareholders and creditors. Corporate Restructuring and Bondholder Wealth  4
 
(b) Agency costs of outside equity 
The  basic  principal-agent  conflict  between  shareholders  and  managers  arises  from 
management trying to extract both pecuniary  and non-pecuniary benefits from the 
firm, while transferring some or all of the costs incurred to the outside shareholders. 
An  important  source  of  such  benefits  may  be  managerial  empire  building  and 
managerial entrenchment (Murphy 1985; Jensen 1986). Empire building is closely 
tied to the argument that managers prefer building less risky, diversified firms with 
lower leverage, so they can reduce the uncertainty of their human capital investment 
(Amihud and Lev 1981), and lessen the probability of bankruptcy and employment 
risk  (Jensen  and  Meckling  1976;  Ramakrishnan  and  Thakor  1984).  To  that  end, 
managerial interests are naturally aligned with those of creditors. 
 
The natural aim of managers and creditors to reduce firm riskiness is in direct conflict 
with  shareholder  interests.  This  relationship  was  first  formalized  by  Black  and 
Scholes (1973) who regard levered equity as a European call option on a firm’s assets. 
In this classic view, the realignment of managerial and shareholder interests inevitably 
damages creditor interests. In market-oriented governance regimes, this realignment is 
largely done by making management a residual claimant in the firm through equity-
based compensation plans. Managerial discretion is also controlled by a variety of 
disciplinary  mechanisms  such  as  boards  of  independent  directors  and  external 
pressures from competitive markets, including capital and product markets (Köke and 
Renneboog 2005) and the markets for corporate control (Manne 1965) and managerial 
labour (Fama 1980). In network-oriented systems, where ownership and credit supply 
are  more  concentrated,  the  active  involvement  of  the  firm’s  stakeholders  in  the 
monitoring of management has historically provided a substitute for these devices. 
 
In  market-oriented  systems,  controlling  the  manager-shareholder  problem  is  also 
potentially tied to increasing the firm’s default risk, which directly damages creditor 
interests. Jensen (1986) describes the implicit incentive effect of increased leverage, 
which commits the firm’s free cash flow to repaying debt. Grossman and Hart (1983) 
find  that  the  increased  threat  of  bankruptcy  and  loss  of  control  may  also  induce 
managers to avoid policies they might prefer but which reduce firm value. Short-term 
borrowing is further shown to limit the tendency of borrowers to increase asset risk 
(Harris and Raviv 1990; Calomiris and Kahn 1991).  
 
(c) Agency costs of risky debt 
The principal-agent conflict that exists between creditors and shareholders gives rise 
to several agency problems. Shareholders may substitute high-risk assets for low-risk Corporate Restructuring and Bondholder Wealth  5
ones,  thus  reducing  creditor  value  to  the  benefit  of  shareholders  (Jensen  and 
Meckling, 1976). Claims dilution by way of new borrowings may also damage the 
interests of existing creditors. These problems are anticipated by creditors, who price 
their debt accordingly and transfer the ensuing costs to the firm itself. Intuitively, 
keeping debt maturity short mitigates the agency costs of debt. Bondholders may also 
write  protective  covenants  into  the  bond  indenture,  while  private  lenders  respond 
through increased monitoring and renegotiation of the debt contract. Billett, King and 
Mauer  (2006)  show  that  the  use  of  covenants  is  increasing  in  debt  maturity  and 
leverage, both proxies for the severity of agency costs associated with debt. 
 
The  creditor-shareholder  conflict  is  of  course  multidimensional  and  may  have 
significant costs for shareholders as well, to the extent that it leads to investment 
distortions (Myers 1977; Lyandres and Zhdanov 2003). Since shareholders ultimately 
bear the costs of inefficient investments in the form of lower equity and firm values, 
they  have  economic  incentives  to  resolve  or  ameliorate  the  shareholder-creditor 
conflict by accepting restrictive debt covenants, or through monitoring and auditing 
activities.  John  and  Nachman  (1985)  show  that  shareholders  may  also  want  to 
mitigate these problems due to reputational concerns. 
 
(d) Signalling effect of the financing decision 
Several theoretical models show that under informational asymmetries, the financing 
method of corporate restructuring has an important signalling effect, as it may reflect 
management’s private information about the value of the assets in place. Leland and 
Pyle (1977), Ross (1977) and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) expect that share prices 
react  positively  to  leverage-increasing  transactions.  The  response  of  bond  prices 
depends on the tradeoff between the negative risk effect of increased leverage, and the 
positive role of the same in controlling managerial discretion over the firm’s cash 
flows. Flannery (1986) argues that the choice of debt maturity also sends a signal 
about the firm’s default probability. 
 
Other studies emphasize that new capital offerings inherently emit a negative signal. 
Additional security issues may suggest that the firm is overvalued (Myers and Majluf, 
1984), or that its future cash flows are less than anticipated (Miller and Rock, 1985). 
Recent empirical studies lend support to these hypotheses (Spiess and Affleck-Graves 
1995 and Hertzel,  Lemmon,  Linck and Rees 2002 on equity; Spiess and Affleck-
Graves 1999 on bonds; and Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel 2003 on bank loans). 
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(e) Tax benefit of debt 
Fama  and  Miller  (1972)  show  that  when  a  firm  employs  leverage  in  its  capital 
structure, its value increases by the market value of the tax subsidy on the interest 
payments.  These  gains  accrue  entirely  to  the  shareholders  of  the  firm,  but  may 
indirectly benefit all other stakeholders including creditors through improved cash 
flows. The tax benefits of debt may not be present for firms that consistently alternate 
between new debt and equity issues, but may be of great economic significance for 
firms that undertake leveraged restructuring. Still, it is debated whether potential tax 
benefits  constitute  a  true  motive  for  undertaking  leveraged  corporate  actions 
(Modigliani  and  Miller  1963;  Miller,  1977;  DeAngelo  and  Masulis  1980). 
Nevertheless, Bartholdy and Mateus (2003) find that tax advantages and provisions 
for tax loss carry-forwards do motivate capital structure decisions. They also note that 
tax benefits may be better exploited in network-oriented governance regimes where 
the amount of debt lent to a firm is not used as an incentive device and is therefore 
less sensitive to agency problems.  
 
(f) Expected bankruptcy and reorganization costs 
The theoretical literature has shown extensively that the expected costs of involuntary 
bankruptcy and reorganization has a significant effect on the value of levered firms. 
These  costs  include  lawyer  and  accountant  fees,  legal  costs  and  the  costs  of 
managerial  time  involved  in  bankruptcy  and  reorganization  proceedings.  Warner 
(1977) estimates however that the direct costs of bankruptcy are small relative to firm 
value.  Masulis  (1980)  approximates  capital  structure  changes  by  investigating 
exchange offers, but does not detect any such bankruptcy cost effect. 
 
 
3.  Empirical evidence 
 
In this section, we consider each type of restructuring in turn, recounting how they are 
predicted to affect creditors and what the existing evidence tells us. Empirically, the 
creditor  wealth  effects  of  corporate  restructuring  are  approximated  by  bond  price 
shocks in the literature. This is an imperfect measure, as it does not account for other 
creditors  such  as  intermediaries.  However,  it  is  otherwise  extremely  difficult  to 
quantify the impact of restructuring in an event study framework. 
 
It is important to emphasize that the agency and signalling implications of corporate 
restructuring cannot be discounted. Nonetheless, restructuring affect creditors through 
two main channels: operating performance and changes in the firm’s capital structure. Corporate Restructuring and Bondholder Wealth  7
At the same time, portfolio restructuring also alters the firm’s cash flow variance, 
collateral and liquidation value. 
  
 
3.1 Portfolio restructuring 
 
Portfolio  restructuring  changes  the  contracting  relationship  that  exists  between 
shareholders  and  creditors  through  altering  the  firm’s  underlying  collateral  and 
liquidation value. In addition, changes in the riskiness of the firms’ cash flow streams 
can  benefit  shareholders  at  the  expense  of  creditors  and  vice  versa.  This  wealth 
redistribution  effect,  defined  as  the  “co-insurance  effect”  by  Lewellen  (1971), 
immediately follows from Black and Scholes’ (1973) view of a levered firm’s equity 
as a European call option, and is also predicted by Higgins and Schall (1975) and 
Galai and Masulis (1976). 
 
 
3.1.1 Portfolio expansion: mergers and acquisitions 
 
The potential motives for merger activity are discussed extensively in the academic 
literature  (Martynova  and  Renneboog,  2005).  The  conventional  argument  is  the 
existence  of  synergistic  gains  that  would  raise  the  value  of  the  combined  firm 
(Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1988). Operating synergies can be derived from economies 
of scale, greater market power or the elimination of duplicate activities. There is also 
scope for financial synergies such as lower cost of capital, reduced tax liability or 
better efficiency of the internal capital market. The latter prescribe that the cash flow 
streams of the merging firms be imperfectly correlated, which reduces bankruptcy risk 
through co-insurance (Levy and Sarnat, 1970; Lewellen, 1971; Higgins and Schall, 
1975). 
 
Modern theory recounts that synergistic gains are often insufficient to justify mergers 
deals. Roll’s (1986) hubris hypothesis argues that there may be no synergies in the 
first  place,  due  to  the  susceptibility  of  managers  to  make  mistakes.  An  equally 
undesirable  explanation  is  that  mergers  simply  occur  because  they  enhance  the 
welfare of the acquirer’s management. Agency theory dictates that managers can have 
personal  incentives  to  diversify  their  personal  portfolio  (Amihud  and  Lev,  1981), 
mitigate  bankruptcy  and  employment  risk  (Ramakrishnan  and  Thakor,  1984),  and 
increase  their  own  compensation  though  empire  building  (Murphy,  1985).  Under 
informational  asymmetries,  inadequate  monitoring  and  a  lack  of  equity-based 
compensation, managers are afforded sufficient discretion to pursue such strategies, Corporate Restructuring and Bondholder Wealth  8
and  transfer  some  or  all  of  the  costs  to  the  outside  shareholders  of  the  firm. 
Accordingly,  Morck,  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1990)  show  that  mergers  that  are 
potentially motivated by managerial private benefits trigger a reduction in shareholder 
wealth. 
 
The  complexity  of  these  issues  makes  it  difficult  to  predict  how  bondholders  are 
affected  by  merger  activity.  Creditors  fundamentally  benefit  from  a  reduction  in 
default risk. Thus, if the merger induces sufficient co-insurance, or is motivated by 
managerial agency problems, it will tend to increase bondholder wealth. If the deal 
otherwise creates no value, this will occur through a wealth shift from shareholders. 
Galai  and  Masulis  (1976)  make  this  point  for  conglomerate  mergers,  which  are 
typically penalized with a “conglomerate discount” as there is no discerning economic 
relationship  between  the  parties  (Rajan,  Servaes  and  Zingales,  2000).  In  non-
conglomerate mergers, operating synergies dominate, but bondholders may still share 
some  of  the  ensuing  wealth  benefits.  Strong  shareholders  may  try  to  reverse  any 
reduction in default risk, however, for example by financing the deal with leverage. 
 
(Insert Table 1) 
 
Empirically,  the  literature  provides  ambiguous  results  but  suggests  that  the 
bondholders of US acquiring firms do not gain from merger activity (see Table 1). 
Billett,  King  and  Mauer  (2004)  report  significantly  negative  excess  bond  returns 
regardless of the acquirer’s bond rating, the payment method, and whether the merger 
is conglomerate or not. Earlier, Kim and McConnell (1977), Asquith and Kim (1982), 
Walker (1994) and Dennis and McConnell (1986) find that bondholders neither gain 
nor lose following merger announcements. Eger (1983) and Maquieira, Megginson 
and Nail (1998) focus on stock-for-stock mergers exclusively, omitting any effect the 
payment  method  may  have.  Eger  finds  positive  excess  returns,  but  Maquieira, 
Megginson and Nail can only confirm these for non-conglomerate deals. 
 
Of the earlier studies, those that separately consider target firms unanimously report 
normal  returns  for  target  bondholders.  To  the  extent  that  target  firms  tend  to  be 
smaller  and  lower  rated,  this  goes  against  the  expectation  that  target  bondholders 
should benefit more from co-insurance. Billett, King and Mauer (2004) show strong 
evidence for this contention. The authors find positive excess returns, which however 
are not uniformly significant across all specifications. The positive gains are driven by 
junk-grade targets, which indeed should profit from lower credit risk in the combined 
firm. Excess returns in investment-grade targets are significantly negative, showing 
that the benefits of co-insurance can be negligible in creditworthy firms. Corporate Restructuring and Bondholder Wealth  9
 
Renneboog, Szilagyi and Martynova (2006) are the first to provide non-US evidence 
on  how  bondholders  are  affected  by  corporate  restructuring  through  mergers.  The 
authors investigate European domestic and cross-border mergers using a large sample 
of investment-grade Eurobonds. The results nicely capture the different dynamics of 
the creditor-firm relationship in market- and network-oriented governance regimes. 
The authors find generally better acquirer excess returns than those reported for the 
US. Gains are highest from domestic mergers in continental Europe, where strong 
banks actively support creditor interests. UK bondholders benefit most from cross-
border deals where creditor protection and claims dispute resolution are better in the 
target  country.  Bond  prices  in  the  UK  also  respond  more  to  fundamentals  and 
perceived asset risk, which in continental Europe are disregarded in domestic deals. 
The excess bond returns are also positive but insignificant for target firms, which 
reinforces the modest co-insurance benefits that exist for large, highly rated targets. 
 
 
3.1.2 Portfolio reduction: corporate refocusing 
 
Since the early 1980s, a distinctive element of US corporate activity has been the 
prevalence of restructuring actions that increase a firm’s business focus. Firms may 
choose one of three main mechanisms to divest an operating unit: equity carve-outs, 
spin-offs and asset sell-offs
1. Aside from the economic gains associated with asset 
restructuring,  carve-outs  and  spin-offs  may  be  particularly  effective  in  reducing 
agency costs. These transactions take subsidiaries public, thus disclosure and external 
monitoring  are  improved,  and  managerial  compensation  can  be  tied  closer  to  the 
subsidiary’s market value. Carve-outs may also signal that the subsidiary is over-, 
while the parent firm is undervalued (Welch 1989; Nanda 1991). Spin-offs have no 
signalling effect, as the shares of the subsidiary are distributed on a pro rata basis to 
the parent’s existing shareholders. Spin-offs do not provide the parent firm with cash 
either, thus agency problems related to free cash flow are avoided. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) stress the importance of sell-offs as a means to resolve 
financial  distress.  They  are  typically  negotiated  privately,  thus  bypass  external 
monitoring  and  potentially  generate  free  cash  flow  concerns.  Owing  to  these 
conditions, sell-offs tend to be perceived less favourably than are spin-offs and carve 
                                                 
1  Equity  carve-outs  are  initial  public  offerings  of  subsidiary  equity,  where  the  parent  maintains  a 
controlling interest. Spin-offs are pro rata stock dividends that distribute subsidiary ownership to the 
shareholders of the parent. In effect, the firm is divided into two (or more) firms with an identical set of 
shareholders. Asset sell-offs are sales of subsidiaries to third parties, typically via private negotiation. 
For a more elaborate description see Slovin, Sushka and Ferraro (1995). Corporate Restructuring and Bondholder Wealth  10
outs.  The  reverse  side  of  these  transactions,  partial  acquisitions,  induce  agency 
problems  similar  to  those  seen  in  mergers  and  acquisitions.  Of  course,  partial 
acquisitions are usually smaller relative to the size of the parties involved, and are 
typically friendly and synergistic. 
 
It is evident that all three forms of corporate refocusing can trigger wealth transfers 
between shareholders to creditors. Galai and Masulis (1976) describe how unexpected 
spin-offs expropriate collateral and liquidation value available to creditors, and carve-
outs and sell-offs have a similar impact. The literature documents several cases where 
creditor interests are damaged by an uneven allocation of debt between the parent and 
the subsidiary. Corporate refocusing also leads to a loss of co-insurance, particularly 
in cross-industry transactions where the cash flows of the parent and subsidiary are 
not highly correlated (John, 1993). 
 
(Insert Table 2) 
 
The empirical literature on the actual wealth effects of corporate refocusing remains 
relatively  scarce  (see  Table  2).  No  evidence  is  available  on  how  bondholders  are 
affected  by  equity  carve-outs.  Schipper  and  Smith  (1983)  briefly  examine  the 
behaviour of bond prices and bond ratings around spin-off announcements, and find 
little evidence of bondholder expropriation. Hite and Owers (1983) find insignificant 
negative abnormal bond returns, which may be due to the small sample used, but 
suggests that bondholders anticipate and contain wealth transfers. This latter argument 
is  confirmed  by  Veld  and  Veld-Merkoulova  (2005)  who  show  insignificant  or 
significant gains depending on the specification, suggesting that firm value increases 
compensate  for  the  wealth  transfer  effect.  Contrasting  evidence  is  presented  by 
Maxwell and Rao (2003). The authors find that on average, parent bondholders suffer 
significant losses, which depend on changes in leverage and the underlying collateral, 
but not on a reduction in co-insurance. Parrino (1997) examines a single textbook 
case, the 1993 spin-off of Marriott’s management businesses, and also finds evidence 
of substantial bondholder losses
2.  
 
The  wealth  effects  of  asset  sell-offs  are  documented  by  Datta  and  Iskandar-Datta 
(1996) and Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2003). These papers find that sell-offs 
typically  enhance  bondholder  wealth.  However,  many  transactions  damage 
                                                 
2 The infamous Marriott spin-off has been subject to much discussion. The deal’s original plan left the 
parent firm with the bulk of Marriott’s long-term debt, but stripped it of most of its assets and cash 
flow. In the end, Marriott’s bondholders were able to force the firm to alter its plans and won more 
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bondholders  depending  on  the  underlying  motive  and  the  way  the  proceeds  are 
distributed. For the acquirers of the disposed assets, Datta and Iskandar-Datta (1995) 
and  Datta  et  al.  (2003)  find  significant  bondholder  losses.  The  authors  ultimately 
show that the benefits of co-insurance and increased collateral do not compensate for 
a simultaneous increase in leverage and the deterioration of performance expectations. 
 
Easterwood  (1998)  examines  the  special  case  of  divestments  made  by  firms  that 
underwent  leveraged  buyouts  in  the  1980s.  He  reports  that  on  average,  these 
transactions are not associated with bondholder wealth changes, which may indicate 
that their wealth enhancing effect is balanced out by possible wealth expropriation in 
the highly levered firm. This is supported by the author’s finding that divestments 
induce positive abnormal bond returns in firms that are not financially distressed, but 
negative ones in those firms that are. Furthermore, the bondholder losses in distressed 
firms are only significant when core assets are divested. 
 
These results, and Easterwood’s (1998) finding that abnormal returns are negatively 
related to the firm’s post-buyout capital structure, also lend weak support to the intra-
creditor  wealth  transfer  hypothesis  of  Rajan  (1992)  and  Diamond  (1993).  This 
hypothesis postulates that when a firm is in distress, private lenders may press for the 
early liquidation of assets at the expense of other, less senior creditors. Of course, 
early liquidation may be most detrimental when it involves core assets, whereas the 
disposal of non-core assets may be beneficial, to the extent that the proceeds are used 
to pay off existing debt (Datta and Iskandar-Datta 1995). 
 
 
3.2  Financial restructuring 
 
Transactions  of  financial  restructuring  are  fundamentally  different  from  portfolio 
restructuring,  as  they  are  directly  aimed  at  altering  the  firm’s  capital  structure. 
Creditors are directly affected by any such capital structure changes, since they may 
entail a sizeable change in the firm’s leverage ratio and ceteris paribus change the 
firm’s  default  probability.  Masulis  (1980)  takes  account  of  the  three  effects  that 
broadly define creditor wealth changes entailed by capital structure alterations: the 
wealth redistribution effect (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and the expected bankruptcy 
cost  effect  (Robichek  and  Myers  1966;  Kraus  and  Litzenberger  1973), 
counterbalanced by a more modest corporate tax effect (Modigliani and Miller 1963). 
The direction and size of creditor wealth changes is also impacted by the incentive 
effect of leverage and any ensuing investment effect associated with the use of the 
funds. Corporate Restructuring and Bondholder Wealth  12
 
3.2.1 New debt issues 
 
The creditor wealth effects of changes in the firm’s capital structure can be most 
simply investigated through the response of existing bondholders to announcements 
of new capital offerings. The empirical literature provides scarce and inconclusive 
direct evidence on the wealth effects of debt issuance (see Table 3). Kolodny and 
Suhler (1988) report that the announcement of new debt issues has a positive effect on 
existing  bondholders,  and  the  wealth  gains  actually  increase  in  the  firm’s  initial 
leverage  and  the  size  of  the  issue.  To  some  extent,  this  result is  compatible  with 
Akhigbe, Easterwood and Pettit (1997). The authors find that bond prices respond 
negatively only when the new debt issue is motivated by a current cash flow shortfall. 
Ultimately, these findings are consistent with Miller and Rock’s (1985) signalling 
hypothesis  rather  than  with  the  motive  of  creditor  expropriation.  Accordingly, 
shareholders have also been shown to be unaffected by debt issue announcements 
(Eckbo, 1986; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; Akhigbe, Easterwood and Pettit, 1997). 
 
(Insert Table 3) 
 
3.2.2 Seasoned equity offerings 
 
Theory  suggests  that  stock  markets  tend  to  react  negatively  to  new  equity  issues 
(Myers and Majluf 1984; Asquith and Mullins 1986; Masulis and Korwar 1986). The 
perception that seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) convey a negative signal about the 
issuing firm’s prospects is supported by the general finding that on average, operating 
performance declines after such transactions (Loughran and Ritter 1997; Jegadeesh 
2000). 
(Insert Table 4) 
 
Creditors are also expected to respond negatively to adverse signals about the firm’s 
future prospects (see Table 4). However, they should benefit ceteris paribus from the 
leverage-reducing effect on equity issuance. Kalay and Shimrat (1987) find that bond 
prices react negatively to new SEO announcements. This suggests that the signalling 
effect dominates, but a wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders cannot be 
ruled out. Elliott, Prevost and Rao (2002) find stronger evidence for such a wealth 
transfer. They report considerable bondholder gains that increase with debt maturity 
and firm default risk, and emphasize the redistribution effect. Eberhart and Siddique 
(2002)  find  similar  results  across  a  number  of  event  windows  spanning  from  one 
month to five years. Corporate Restructuring and Bondholder Wealth  13
 
3.2.3 Exchange offers and recapitalizations 
 
Security exchange offers and recapitalizations come closest to approximating pure 
capital structure changes in a firm, as they do not involve simultaneous asset structure 
changes  (in  the  form  of  cash  inflows  or  outflows).  Both  transactions  entail  the 
exchange of different classes of firm securities. However, while exchange offers are 
voluntary, recapitalizations generally require the participation of all securityholders 
and thus have a more pronounced impact on capital structure. In a joint study, Masulis 
(1980)  empirically  examines  debt-for-stock  exchange  offers  and  recapitalizations. 
Capital structure theory predicts that both types of transactions should destroy creditor 
wealth as they increase leverage in the firm (see Table 5). The evidence provided by 
Masulis is consistent with this contention, and the author observes simultaneous gains 
for shareholders. This ultimately supports the wealth transfer hypothesis, reinforced 
by  the  finding  that  bondholders  suffer  the  largest  losses  when  unprotected  by 
covenants. Masulis (1983) later develops a linear model to estimate the firm valuation 
effects of these transactions and broadly finds the same results. Cornett and Travlos 
(1989) report different results that lend support to signalling theory. The authors show 
that bondholders do not lose from debt-for-equity exchanges, because the negative 
impact  of  increased  leverage  is  offset  by  better  performance  expectations.  Their 
conjecture  is  reinforced  by  the  negative  bondholder  response  to  leverage-reducing 
equity-for-debt exchanges. 
(Insert Table 5) 
 
Mikkelson (1981) examines how the forced conversion of convertible bonds affects 
security holders in the firm. Debt conversion reduces leverage much the same way as 
do  debt-fore-equity  exchanges.  There  is  no  evidence  that  bondholders  would  reap 
considerable  benefits  from  such  a  transaction,  which  Mikkelson  also  attributes  to 
negative signalling effects. 
 
 
3.2.4. Public-to-private transactions 
 
Portfolio  refocusing  is  often  preceded  by  public-to-private  transactions.  These 
transactions are often referred to collectively as leveraged buyouts (LBOs), as they 
are almost exclusively financed with massive leverage. The majority of LBOs are 
management-led,  but  firms  may  be  taken  private  by  a  variety  of  entities:  the 
incumbent  management  (management  buyout,  MBO),  an  outside  management 
(management  buyin,  MBI),  employees  (employee  buyout,  EBO),  or  institutional Corporate Restructuring and Bondholder Wealth  14
investors and private equity firms (institutional buyout, IBO). Renneboog and Simons 
(2005) provide a detailed discussion and empirical testing of each of these transaction 
types. 
 
Jensen  (1986)  notes  that  LBO  firms  typically  provide  stronger  incentives  for 
management  to  increase  firm  value,  which  is  often  the  main  impetus  behind 
subsequent asset disposals. The agency costs of managerial discretion are addressed 
through higher levels of leverage and greater concentration of equity ownership. The 
control function of debt is particularly pronounced in LBOs, since the restructured 
firm’s  post-transaction  leverage  ratio  often  approaches  unity.  At  the  margin,  this 
mostly requires management to borrow from banks, which are often given an equity 
interest  through  strip  financing.  To  the  extent  that  managers  become  shareholders 
themselves,  LBOs  can  also  directly  mitigate  the  manager-shareholder  conflict 
(Renneboog, Simons and Wright, 2005). 
 
(Insert Table 6) 
 
In  leveraged  transactions,  increased  monitoring  tends  not  to  fully  compensate 
creditors for the potentially vast agency costs of risky debt. This is reflected in the 
finding of Marais, Schipper and Smith (1989) that the rating agency Moody’s Investor 
Service systematically downgrades firms undergoing LBOs. The empirical literature 
does not provide fully conclusive evidence either way (see Table 6). Asquith and 
Wizman (1990), Travlos and Cornett (1993), Cook, Easterwood and Martin (1992) 
and Warga and Welch (1993) find statistically significant bondholder losses, which 
provides evidence for wealth expropriation. Conversely, Marais, Schipper and Smith 
(1989) find insignificantly negative abnormal returns and conclude that bondholders 
adequately  protect  themselves,  or  that  the  wealth  expropriation  effect  is  offset  by 
improvements in the expected cash flows. Of these studies, several demonstrate that 
abnormal returns are sensitive to covenant protection (Asquith and Wizman 1990; 
Walker 1991; Cook et al., 1992); maturity (Walker 1991; Warga and Welch 1993; 
Cook et al. 1992) and bond ratings (Warga and Welch 1993). 
 
 
3.2.5 Leveraged recapitalizations  
 
Leveraged recapitalizations (LRs) are often used to fend off a hostile takeover bid. 
Under this strategy, the firm incurs substantial additional debt to repurchase shares or 
distribute a large special dividend to the current shareholders. Like LBOs, a typical 
LR entails a huge increase in leverage, and thus should lead to better alignment of Corporate Restructuring and Bondholder Wealth  15
shareholder and managerial interests.  In lieu of the cash payout, management can 
often  increase  their  own  shareholdings  either  directly  or  indirectly  (through  stock 
options or retirement plans). 
(Insert Table 7) 
 
The massive leverage associated with LRs is expected to induce considerable creditor 
losses  through  increased  risk.  However,  the  empirical  literature  offers  limited 
evidence for such an effect (see Table 7). Handa and Radhakrishnan (1991) find that 
on  average,  bondholders  earn  insignificant  negative  abnormal  returns  in  the  two 
weeks around an LR announcement, and significant positive gains immediate before 
the announcement date. Gupta and Rosenthal (1991) also report insignificant negative 
abnormal bond returns for longer time periods. A drawback of both these studies is 
that they work with small samples, which downward biases the detectability of any 
impact associated with LRs. Moreover, many of the firms undertaking LRs are under 
imminent  takeover  threat,  which  complicates  the  investigation  of  announcement 
returns. An indication of longer-term creditor wealth losses is provided by frequent 
rating downgrades of the restructuring firms by Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. 
 
 
3.2.6 Dividend payouts and share repurchases 
 
Many studies on how a firm can outright expropriate its creditors cite the classic case 
where the firm borrows cash to distribute dividends or repurchase shares. The creditor 
wealth implications of these transactions are driven by two main hypotheses. The 
signalling hypothesis (Bhattacharya 1979; Kalay 1980) suggests that redistributing 
cash flows to shareholders conveys positive information about the prospects of the 
firm.  This  holds  for  dividend  increases  in  particular,  which  indicate  a  permanent 
commitment to higher payouts. However, all else equal these payout mechanisms also 
increase leverage, and in the absence of adequate protection, creditors may suffer 
losses as a result. 
(Insert Table 8) 
 
There  are  numerous  studies  that  examine  the  signalling  versus  wealth  transfer 
hypotheses of both dividend announcements and share repurchases (see Table 8). The 
evidence for dividend increases is very mixed. Woolridge (1983) and Handjinicolau 
and Kalay (1984) find insignificantly positive bond price reactions. This lends support 
to a signalling effect, while not ruling out a wealth transfer in highly levered firms in 
particular. Jayaraman and Shastri (1988) report similar results for special dividends. Corporate Restructuring and Bondholder Wealth  16
Dhillon and Johnson (1994) find that bond prices actually fall upon the announcement 
of dividend increases, which is more supportive of the wealth transfer hypothesis.  
 
Dann (1981) investigates the wealth effects of share repurchase announcements. On 
the announcement day,  he finds insignificantly  negative bond returns and positive 
abnormal stock returns, which suggests that bondholders may lose more than they 
gain from the signalling effect. Maxwell and Stephens (2003) find much stronger 
evidence for both hypotheses, reporting significant bondholder losses on average, but 
sizeable gains in firms where shareholders respond favourably to the transaction. The 
authors also show that bondholder losses are greater when the repurchase program is 
large, and when the firm’s bond rating is non-investment grade. This suggests that a 
share repurchase program is still viewed by the market as a positive signal, but any 
wealth benefits accrued to bondholders are expropriated. Rating agencies are found to 




3.2.7 Executive stock option plans 
 
Finally, executive stock option plans are an increasingly controversial device used to 
mitigate the manager-shareholder conflict. ESOPs tie managerial compensation to the 
firm’s share price, which is meant to realign managerial interests with those of the 
shareholders.  As  managerial  and  creditor  interests  inherently  coincide  otherwise, 
ESOPs  should  damage  creditors  to  the  benefit  of  shareholders.  Table  9  shows 
compelling evidence in this regard provided by DeFusco, Johnson and Zorn (1990). 
Bruner and Brownlee (1990) take a single case study of Polaroid’s 1988 leveraged 
ESOP, and find similar results. 
(Insert Table 9) 
 
 
4.  Concluding remarks and research agenda 
 
This paper has provided a comprehensive overview of the empirical literature on how 
corporate restructuring affects bondholder wealth. As has been shown, evidence on 
restructuring and its consequences for the firm and its creditors remains patchy. This 
largely owes to the fact that restructuring is a complex and multidimensional event, 
whose impact on creditor wealth is the net effect of a variety of factors. 
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The  validity  of  existing  studies  has  come  to  be  increasingly  criticized  for  issues 
related to sample size, data quality and the methodologies employed. Kahle, Maxwell 
and  Xu  (2005)  find  that  the  various  methodologies  historically  used  to  examine 
bondholder wealth changes, such as mean-adjusted models, value-weighted portfolio 
approaches and factor models may be subject to serious misspecification. The authors 
stop  short  of  naming  a  single  best  methodology.  Rather,  they  propose  that  bonds 
should be priced using matched equal-weighted portfolios or individual bonds, and 
that these two methods are largely complements. Some general guidelines are also 
drawn, which warn that much of the empirical evidence should be treated with caveats 
and call for future research in most areas. 
 
The  lack  of  related  studies  on  the  network-oriented  governance  systems  of 
Continental  Europe  and  Japan  represents  another  gap  in  the  existing  literature. 
Existing  US  studies  unambiguously  show  that  restructuring  can  trigger  significant 
wealth transfers between bondholders and shareholders, which suggests that creditors 
are not fully protected against deliberate wealth expropriation. In network-oriented 
systems, agency problems in the context of the firm are addressed differently, and 
bondholder-shareholder agency problems may be consequently less severe. This is 
captured by the European M&A study of Renneboog, Szilagyi and Martynova (2006), 
the first non-US paper in this field. Further exploration of this issue would provide 
useful insights into the link between restructuring and creditor wealth, yet it has been 
virtually ignored by empirical research, or examined only indirectly. Until recently, 
the potential for research on network-oriented regimes was also constrained by the 
limited number of marketable debt issues by restructuring firms, which are the only 
instruments that allow for a direct investigation of this issue. On-going developments 
in the international corporate environment now demand greater attention being paid to 
these countries. In Europe, in particular, market deregulation, increased competition, 
economic and financial integration, new tax and accounting regulations, as well as 
recent  struggles  with  pension  reform  have  not  only  triggered  frantic  restructuring 
activity,  but  also  set  off  a  gradual  convergence  of  corporate  governance  regimes 
towards  the  market-oriented  model.  This  comes  at  a  time  when  market-oriented 
systems are being increasingly questioned in their ability to control agency problems 
themselves, not least due to the recent massive overinvestment in the US technology 
sector and some of the biggest corporate scandals in history. 
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Table 1: The bondholder wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions 
This table shows the estimated bondholder returns of the total public debt of the restructuring firm. 
Returns are calculated using an event study methodology. N is either the number of different bonds 
used in the analysis, or in studies where an equally weighted average of the firm’s outstanding bonds is 
used, the number of firms. 
*** ,
**, 







Deal type  Merging party  Event 
window  N  Wealth 









All  [0] month  44  -0.45% 
Two-index market 
model using Ibbotson 
and Sinquefeld’s 
equal-weighted high-
quality corporate bond 
index and value-
weighted NYSE stock 
index 
All  62  1.07% 







   Target 
[0] month 
24  1.05% 
Matched bond with 
matching criteria 
rating, maturity date, 
coupon rate, industrial 
classification. 




Acquirer  [-30,0] days  33  1.01%*** 
Matched portfolio with 
matching criteria rating 
and maturity date 
Acquirer  67  -0.17% 
   BBB or below  31  -0.51%* 





US  Completed mergers 
   BBB or below 
[-1,0] days 
19  0.35% 
Dow Jones Industrial 
Bond Index 
All  92  0.31%  Completed mergers 
   Target  33  0.83% 





Stock-for-stock   All 
[0] month 
12  1.39% 
Matched US Treasury 
bond 
All  253  0.44% 




   Target  31  1.22% 
All  282  1.44%*** 










   Target 
[-2,2] 
months 
93  0.50% 
Matched US Treasury 
bond with matching 
criteria maturity date 
and coupon rate, using 
mean valuation 
prediction errors (VPE) 
Acquirer  831  -0.17*** 
   BBB- or above  680  -0.09* 
   Below BBB-  151  -0.55* 
Target  265  1.09** 





US  All mergers 
   Below BBB- 
[-1,0] 
months 




Acquirer  225  0.56*** 
A. Listed target  76  0.39* 
B. Domestic  79  0.84*** 
    Cross-border  146  0.41** 
C. Creditor protection 
    worsened  70  0.12 
    Creditor protection 
    improved  37  0.88*** 
Target  24  0.62 






Europe  All mergers 
    Cross-border 
[-1,0] 
months 
13  0.17 
Investment-grade 
Eurobonds, matched 
portfolio with matching 
criteria currency, rating 
and duration Corporate Restructuring and Bondholder Wealth  24
 
Table 2: The bondholder wealth effects of equity carve-outs, spin-offs and sell-offs 
This table shows the estimated bondholder returns of the total public debt of the restructuring firm. 
Returns are calculated using an event study methodology. N is either the number of different bonds 
used in the analysis, or in studies where an equally weighted average of the firm’s outstanding bonds is 
used, the number of firms. 
*** ,
**, 






Deal Type  Transaction party  Event 
window  N  Wealth 
change  Benchmark/methodology 
Hite and Owers 
(1983) 
1963-1981 
US  Spin-offs  Parent  [-10,10] 







offs  Acquirer  [-1,0] days  63  -0.66%*** 
Mean-adjusted excess 
returns, US Treasury 
bonds 
Parent  134  -0.22% 
   Non-distressed 
   parent  81  0.75%*** 
   Distressed parent  53  -1.70%* 
      Disposal of 
      related assets  30  -2.34%*** 
      Disposal of 
      unrelated assets  23  -0.87% 
   Onset of distress  31  -2.55%** 
      Disposal of 








      Disposal of 
      unrelated assets 
[0] month 
14  -2.62% 
Blume and Keim (1988) 
index, Merrill Lynch High 
Yield Index 









96  -0.40%** 
Mean-adjusted excess 
returns, US Treasury 
bonds 
Parent  80  -0.89%*** 
A. >20% of total 
    assets  41  -1.46%*** 
   < 20% of total 
    assets  38  -0.24%*** 
B. Cross-industry  64  -0.74%*** 
    Same-industry  16  -1.43%*** 




US  Spin-offs 
    Non-investment 
grade 
[0] month 
16  -2.51%*** 
Mean-adjusted excess 






US  Spin-offs  Parent  [-1,1] days  77  0.80%  Merrill Lynch corporate 
bond indices 
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Table 3: The bondholder wealth effects of new debt issues 
This table shows the estimated bondholder returns of the total public debt of the restructuring firm. 
Returns are calculated using an event study methodology. N is either the number of different bonds 
used in the analysis, or in studies where an equally weighted average of the firm’s outstanding bonds is 
used, the number of firms. 
*** ,
**, 






Deal type  Event 








US  New debt issues  [0] 
month  66  1.95%**  Matched bond 
New debt issues  399  0.19%** 
   Motivated by cash flow shortfall  133  -0.38%** 
   Motivated by unexpected capex  133  0.13% 
   Motivated by unexpected leverage 






















Table 4: The bondholder wealth effects of new equity issues 
This table shows the estimated bondholder returns of the total public debt of the restructuring firm. 
Returns are calculated using an event study methodology. N is the number of firms; as an equally 
weighted average of the  firm’s outstanding bonds is used, the number of  firms. 
*** ,
**, 
*   indicate 






Deal type  Event 
window  N  Wealth 












US  New equity issues  [1] month  140  0.9%** 
Matched portfolio with matching 
criteria rating and duration, buy-
and-hold returns in event time 
New equity issues  103  0.42%*** 
A. Effect on long 
     term debt  69  0.69%*** 
    Effect on short 
     term debt  49  -0.11% 
B. Moody’s rating > 
     median rating  57  0.43% 
Elliott, Prevost 
and Rao (2002) 
1980-2000 
US 
    Moody’s rating < 
     median rating 
[0,1] days 
50  0.87%*** 
Mean-adjusted excess returns, 
US Treasury bonds 
 Corporate Restructuring and Bondholder Wealth  26
Table 5: The bondholder wealth effects of exchange offers and recapitalizations 
This table shows the estimated bondholder returns of the total public debt of the restructuring firm. 
Returns are calculated using an event study methodology. N is either the number of different bonds 
used in the analysis, or in studies where an equally weighted average of the firm’s outstanding bonds is 
used, the number of firms. 
*** ,
**, 






Deal type  Event 




Debt-for-equity exchange offers and 




No covenant protection 
[-1,0] 
days 








Convertible debt calls where 
conversion forced 
[0] 








US  Equity-for-debt exchange offers 
[0] day 










Table 6: The bondholder wealth effects of public-to-private transactions 
This table shows the estimated bondholder returns of the total public debt of the restructuring firm. 
Returns are calculated using an event study methodology. N is either the number of different bonds 
used in the analysis, or in studies where an equally weighted average of the firm’s outstanding bonds is 
used, the number of firms. 
*** ,
**, 
*  indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Study  Sample period 
/ country  Deal type  Event 
window  N  Wealth 
change  Benchmark/methodology 
[-69,0] days  33  0.00%  Marais, Schipper and Smith 
(1989) 
1974-1985 
US  All  [0, offer 
completed]  30  0.00% 
Dow Jones Bond Index 
All  199  -1.1%*** 
Strong 
covenants  29  -0.10% 
Weak 
covenants    -0.30% 





  -2.60%*** 
Shearson-Lehman-Hutton 
Bond Index 
Walker (1991)  1982-1989 
US  All  [0] month  24  -2.60%** 
Mean-adjusted excess 
returns, US Treasury 
bonds 
MBOs  62  -2.56%***  Cook, Easterwood and 
Martin (1992) 
1981-1989 
US     Completed 
[0] month 
32  -3.35%*** 
Shearson-Lehman-Hutton 
Bond Index 
Travlos and Cornett (1993)  1975-1983 
US  All  [-1,0] days  10  -1.08%*  CRSP equal-weighted 
index 
Warga and Welch (1993)  1985-1989 
US  All  [-2,2] 
months  36  -5.91%***  Lehman Brothers 
Corporate Bond Index 
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Table 7: The bondholder wealth effects of leveraged recapitalizations 
This table shows the estimated bondholder returns of the total public debt of the restructuring firm. 
Returns are calculated using an event study methodology. N is either the number of different bonds 
used in the analysis, or in studies where an equally weighted average of the firm’s outstanding bonds is 
used, the number of firms. TS designates start of takeover, C stands for completion of recapitalization. 
*** ,
**, 







type  Event window  N  Wealth 
change  Benchmark/methodology 




US  All 
[-15,15] days  19  -6.15% 
Mean-adjusted returns 
[TS-1,-2] days  18  -3.56%*** 
[-1,0] days  18  0.17% 
Firms in 
takeover 
play  [1, C-2] days  18  2.51% 








[1, C-2] days  8  -3.09% 
Dow Jones Bond Index 
 
 
Table  8:  The  bondholder  wealth  effects  of  dividend  changes  and  share 
repurchases 
This table shows the estimated bondholder returns of the total public debt of the restructuring firm. 
Returns are calculated using an event study methodology. N is either the number of different bonds 
used in the analysis, or in studies where an equally weighted average of the firm’s outstanding bonds is 
used, the number of firms. 
*** ,
**, 






Deal type  Event 
window  N  Wealth 
change  Benchmark/methodology 
Dann (1981)  1962-1976 
US  Share repurchases  [0,y] days  20  -0.33%  Mean-adjusted returns 
Unexpected dividend increases  248  0.10%  Woolridge 
(1983) 
1970-1977 
US  Unexpected dividend decreases 
[-10,10] days 
45  -0.55%** 
Mean-adjusted returns 




US  Unexpected dividend decreases 
[-x,y] days 
42  -0.48%*** 
Mean-adjusted excess 






US  Special dividends  [-2,0], 
[-1,1] or [-1,0]  65  0.02% 
Mean-adjusted excess 
returns, US Treasury 
bonds 




US  Dividend decreases 
[0,1] days 
70  0.69%*** 
Mean-adjusted excess 
returns, US Treasury 
bonds 
Share repurchases  945  -0.19*** 






Firms with negative change in firm value 
[0] month 
397  -0.71*** 
Mean-adjusted excess 
returns, US Treasury 
bonds 
 
Table 9: The bondholder wealth effects of executive stock option plans 
This table shows the estimated bondholder returns of the total public debt of the restructuring firm. 
Returns are calculated using an event study methodology. N is either the number of different bonds 
used in the analysis, or in studies where an equally weighted average of the firm’s outstanding bonds is 
used, the number of firms. 
*** ,
**, 









window  N  Wealth 
change  Benchmark/methodology 
DeFusco, Johnson and Zorn (1990)  1978-82 
US  ESOPs  [-1] day  26  -0.40**  Dow Jones Industrial Bond 
Index 
 